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External U.S. Commitments Affecting Possible Additional
Products for Sectoral Integration**
by Donald E. deKieffer*
I t became apparent during the Tokyo Round (1973-79) that serious ob-
stacles were developing to the multilateral trade liberalization process.
The European Economic Community has increasingly looked inward to
its problems of economic integration. Japan has become a major interna-
tional trade power, with seemingly impenetrable markets for foreign
manufactured products. And, the advanced LDCs (e.g. Brazil and Ko-
rea) have brought a totally different attitude toward trade policy from
that held by the developed countries which established the GATT and
dominated earlier negotiations.
While pressures for protectionism, and the weakening of the interna-
tional political will to liberalize trade, have worsened since the end of the
Tokyo Round, both the United States and Canadian governments con-
tinue to emphasize the necessity for the maintenance and expansion of an
open global trading system. Neither government, however, intends to
wait for a multilateral consensus before taking concrete steps to liberalize
trade wherever possible. Thus, the United States welcomed the Cana-
dian government's initiative to explore possible bilateral liberalization
agreements in selected sectors, even though there may be complications
in moving ahead bilaterally.
Expanding the scope of bilateral market access between the world's
two largest bilateral trade partners makes a great deal of sense. Joint
U.S.-Canadian working groups have already been established to consider
bilateral liberalization in certain sectors, such as steel; agricultural equip-
ment and inputs; traded computer services and other elements of the "in-
formatics" sector; and government procurement issues, particularly
urban mass transit equipment. In addition, each side plans to continue
to identify additional sectors which may be appropriate for future
discussions.
One of many issues which needs to be addressed is the limitation, if
any, that external U.S. commitments place upon these bilateral negotia-
tions. For example, it must be endured that any bilateral sectoral agree-
ment is in conformity with the U.S. commitment to the GATT. Since
the U.S. has always supported the GATT, and the most-favored-nation
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(MFN) principle which is its cornerstone, it is unlikely that a free-trade
agreement with Canada will obtain support if it is incompatible with this
policy. Thus, forming a bilateral free-trade arrangement would have to
be seen as a move to supplement rather than replace the multilateral
approach.
The day the GATT was born in Geneva, to encourage multilateral-
ism, BENELUX was launched in Brussels, to initiate the movement to-
ward regional free-trade. Consequently, the GATT came at the
intersection of two conflicting trends in international commercial rela-
tions: the determination to revive the MFN principle, and the irrepressi-
ble movement toward regional free trade.
Article XXIV of the GATT is at the locus of these two trends. It
reconciles the apparent contradictions between them by setting ground
rules permitting members to form discriminatory arrangements in clear
violation of MFN practice, but only in compliance with requirements
aimed at preventing such arrangements from becoming inward-looking,
protective "trade blocks," harmful to other countries and inconsistent
with the GATT objective of freer international trade.
Paragraph 4 of Article XXIV sets the tone for permission to deviate
from the normal GATT rules of nondiscrimination; paragraphs 5
through 9 give the specific requirements to be met by the arrangement;
and paragraph 10 provides for a waiver by the contracting parties in the
event these requirements are not fully met.
While the provisions encourage freeing trade, they stipulate that
measures to do so should not raise barriers to the exports of other con-
tracting parties. Discriminatory arrangements are therefore implicitly
limited to the form of either a customs union (CU), a free-trade area
(FTA), or to an interim arrangement leading to one of these. Article
XXIV permits waivers of its requirements, but again only when a CU or
FTA is being formed. The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the
proliferation of preferential arrangements which fall short of free-trade.
Where members wish to create a free-trade arrangement in some other
form, they must seek the special waiver provided in Article XV, which is
somewhat more difficult to obtain than the normal waivers of Article
XXIV.
The definitions of CU and FTA under the GATT set additional re-
quirements. For example, duties and other restrictive regulations be-
tween the participants must be completely eliminated, rather than merely
reduced. Further, the total elimination of trade restrictions must apply
to "substantially all the trade" between the constituent territories when
the products originate in those territories. Perhaps the most important
substantive requirement for a CU, an FTA, or an interim arrangement
leading to either, is that the customs duties and other restrictions im-
posed against imports from non-member countries are not to be made
higher or more burdensome.
[Vol. 10:101 1985]
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The importance of the GATT relation, then, seems to be primarily
that it requires members to have, at least some of the time, a global focus
instead of a regional one. Thus, the compatibility of any U.S.-Canadian
agreement with Article XXIV will probably be decided more on prag-
matic than on legal grounds, Le., according to the real rather than the
nominal effect on other countries. While coverage for sectoral agree-
ments may be found under existing GATT provisions for free trade ar-
eas, or granted by a GATT waiver, an agreement between the two
countries in one or more sectors will need to be reached first. This will
require agreement on such things as: the definition of sectors; the tariff
and non-tariff barriers to be covered by the bilateral agreements; the role
of the states and provinces; and the significance of direct investment bar-
riers. All of these issues will have to be addressed at some future point.
As noted, the GATT requirement of a CU or an FTA is to prevent
the further proliferation of preferential trading arrangements which fall
short of free-trade. One such arrangement, designed to aid developing
countries, is the generalized system of preferences (GSP). In 1976 the
U.S. became the nineteenth developed market-economy country to im-
plement a national GSP program, and the recent GSP Renewal Act of
1984 extended this program for another eight years, until July, 1993.
The GSP is a program whereby duties on a range of products im-
ported into the U.S. from developing countries (LDCs) are eliminated.
The President has designated 114 countries and 26 dependent territories
as eligible suppliers under the GSP. By eliminating U.S. import duties
on about 3,000 product categories, LDC products are more competitive
in the U.S. market, thereby enabling economic development via trade
rather than aid.
Included in the GSP product categories are selected agricultural
items; most wood and paper products; certain chemicals; and a broad
range of manufactured and semi-manufactured articles. Certain prod-
ucts are statutorily excluded, such as: textile and apparel articles subject
to textile agreements; import sensitive electronic, glass, iron, and steel
articles; watches; and certain footwear. The President may also exclude
other products determined to be import sensitive. The continued com-
mitment of the United States to the GSP, and its efforts to achieve fur-
ther integration of developing countries into the international trading
system, may inhibit enhanced sectoral integration to the extent that the
GSP provides preferential treatment and a competitive advantage to
LDCs in certain articles that Canada may also wish to export to the U.S.
Another U.S. development program, the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI), seeks to use trade and tax measures to revitalize the economies of
twenty-seven Caribbean Basin countries. The economies of this region
are fragile and have been seriously affected by escalating costs for im-
ported oil, declining prices for major exports, and shrinking export mar-
kets due to worldwide recession. In combination, these trends have led
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to increased political violence in the area, and the CBI is being imple-
mented in the hope of restoring stability and prosperity to the region.
At the center of the U.S. program is a temporary extension of one-
way, duty-free access to the U.S. market for the Caribbean nations.
Duty-free access will be uninterrupted for twelve years, and will be ex-
tended to all products with the exception of textiles, footwear, petroleum
products, leather goods, and canned tuna. Again, the CBI could inhibit
enhanced sectoral integration to the extent that it provides a competitive
advantage to Caribbean nations in sectors which Canada may wish to
integrate with the U.S.
As a member of OECD, the U.S. has committed itself to pursue
development policies beyond those which deal with the immediate re-
quirements of economic recovery. In particular, OECD members have
emphasized the importance of working with developing countries to help
them strengthen and achieve greater stability in their export earnings.
The GSP and CBI programs attempt to do precisely this. In addition to
the GSP and the CBI, the United States concluded negotiations with
Israel in February, 1985, on the establishment of a bilateral FTA. Am-
bassador Brock has proposed that an FTA also be negotiated between
the U.S. and the ASEAN countries.
Israel has already concluded negotiations with the United States on
its accession to the Government Procurement Code, and was formally
accepted as a party to the Code in May, 1983. Accordingly, with respect
to Israel, the President may waive, in whole or in part, the application of
laws and regulations regarding government procurement which could re-
sult in less favorable treatment to Israel in the supply of such products
than that accorded to U.S. suppliers or foreign suppliers who are parties
to the Code. To the extent that Canada wished to integrate trade with
the U.S. in the government procurement sector, agreements on govern-
ment procurement such as that with Israel may also affect additional
products for sectoral integration.
The U.S. is also committed to ensure that the provisions of its
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties (FCN) are observed.
Under these treaties, the U.S. must accord MFN treatment to the prod-
ucts of the other contracting nation in all matters affecting international
taxation, sale, distribution, storage and use. As a result, the citizens or
subjects of the contracting parties may enjoy the privileges accorded by
either party to those of its most favored nations.
While the general design of the MFN clause is to establish the prin-
ciple of equality of international treatment, thus requiring that U.S. con-
cessions to one nation be extended to all nations with FCN treaties, the
U.S. commitment to its FCN partners may not affect U.S.-Canadian
sectoral integration. If the advantages accorded by either Canada or the
U.S. to the other is by virtue of a customs union or free-trade area, the
MFN clause in the FCN treaty shall not apply. The U.S. is required,
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however, to inform its FCN partners of its plans, and afford them an
adequate opportunity for consultation.
A particularly thorny problem for future U.S.-Canadian trade rela-
tions is that any sectorally liberalized industry has to be a "global win-
ner" in the long term. For example, the North American auto industry
looked like a winner in 1965, but by the late seventies it became evident
that comparative advantage was shifting. It is now fairly obvious that
the U.S. and Japan will eventually have their own "AutoPact," and that
the North American Autopact could become moribund. Whatever Can-
ada's unit cost advantage relative to the U.S. might be, it is likely to be
insufficient to alter the political economy leverage of the U.S. in persuad-
ing Japanese auto manufacturers to choose to site their North American
facilities in the U.S. rather than Canada.
In the future, North American sectoral agreements should be con-
sidered only for those products where the reorganized continental mar-
ket emerges with a long-running global comparative advantage. This
will ensure that trade expansion effects are paramount, and that trade
diversion effects are minimal. If agreements are concluded in those sec-
tors where global advantage does not exist, or soon falls prey to the im-
pact of new producers or products, than the agreement will surely come
under both economic and political pressure.
Efforts to find ways to cope with a declining sector that has been
liberalized across the two countries, but which retains a common set of
external tariffs, are bound to lead to friction. Difficulties of this sort
could easily trigger new reciprocity-type arguments; conflicting programs
for industrial revitalization; and substantial dissimilarities in the future
use of tariffs and other trade policy measures regarding third countries.
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